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IMPACT OF MAINE’S CLEAN ELECTIONS ACT

Cleaning
House?

Does full public financing of legislative elections

Assessing the Impact
of Maine’s Clean
Elections Act
on Electoral
Competitiveness

make races more competitive? Richard Powell

by Richard J. Powell

able to rely substantially less on private contributions

analyzes the impact of the Maine Clean Elections
Act (MCEA) on house and senate elections since its
passage in 2000. Using statistical analysis, he
concludes the MCEA has not significantly increased
competiveness, even though candidates have been

and the financial disparity between candidates has
decreased significantly. Powell suggests that analysis
of the Maine case will be useful as the nation and
other states consider public-financing laws comparable to the MCEA.
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Because publicINTRODUCTION

I

n the words of the well-known political scientist
Robert Dahl, “In a democratic vision, opportunities to exercise power over government of the state
ought to be distributed equally among citizens”
(Dahl 1996: 639). The current system of financing
U.S. elections, based largely on private donations,
and the importance of money in determining election
outcomes, have led many observers to doubt whether
the U.S. succeeds in reaching Dahl’s standard. As a
result of widespread concerns that elections—and
thus the affairs of government—were being unduly
influenced by special interest groups through their
campaign donations, many states have implemented
some form of public financing of state legislative
elections. In the vast majority of those states, levels
of candidate participation are very low due to insufficient funding and regulatory control. In 2000, Maine
and Arizona, however, became the first states in the
U.S. to offer full public financing of their legislative
elections in a way that has encouraged widespread
participation.
The Maine Clean Elections Act (MCEA),
enacted via a ballot initiative in 1996, is a voluntary
system overseen by the Maine Ethics Commission.
Candidates choosing to participate in the system
are required to raise a limited amount of money in
the form of small private donations to prove their
viability. Once designated as clean-elections candidates, they receive campaign funds from the taxpayerfunded system. The amount disbursed to each
candidate varies, but it averaged $6,695 in the house
and $34,103 in the senate in 2008. Not all candidates
received that much money, however, due to the
disbursement of matching funds in some races.
If a MCEA candidate faces a non-MCEA opponent,
he or she receives matching funds to balance out the
difference. In exchange for accepting public funding,
MCEA candidates are not permitted to raise any
additional outside funds from private donations
for use in their own campaigns. Participation rates
have been high due to relatively high funding
levels—by Maine standards—and the matching-fund
provision, which significantly reduces the possible
advantages of non-participation.

Perhaps owing to the
recentness of these reforms, little
research has yet addressed the
impact of full public financing
on state legislative elections.
To fill that void, I conducted
a study to examine the impact
of MCEA on legislative elections
in the state. Because publicfinancing laws have been
proposed at the national level
and in a number of other states,
this study provides us with an
early glance at the implications
of such reforms. How many
candidates are currently
accepting public funds? Does
public financing make elections
more or less competitive
(controlling, of course, for a
range of electorally relevant
factors)? Are incumbents more
or less secure under public
financing?

financing laws have
been proposed at
the national level
and in a number
of other states,
this study provides
us with an early
glance at the implications of such
reforms.

PUBLIC FUNDING OF ELECTIONS

T

he link between electoral institutions and democratic representation has been a perennial issue
in U.S. political history. Numerous reforms—the
Australian (secret) ballot, voter-registration laws, direct
primaries, and many others—have aimed to strengthen
the bonds of representation between U.S. citizens and
their elected officials, while attempting to limit the
influence of special interest groups. In recent decades,
much of the focus of electoral reform has been on the
campaign-finance system. For example, following the
Watergate scandal, Congress enacted the far-reaching
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA),
which mandated full disclosure of all campaign contributions and placed limits on political donations. FECA
also set up an optional system of publicly financed
elections for the presidency, paid for by taxpayer contributions via the check-off option on their yearly tax
returns. The goal, of course, was to remove the financial dependence of candidates on private donors. In
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TABLE 1

Percentage of Candidates Accepting MCEA Funds,
2000–2008
House (%)

Senate (%)

2000

29.2

50.7

2002

60.2

73.2

2004

78.5

79.5

2006

79.9

86.5

2008

83.2

79.7

doing so, reformers hoped to weaken the ties between
special interest groups and elected officials, instead
making office-holders more responsive to their constituents (Corrado et al. 1997; Jacobson 2001). In 2002,
sweeping new regulations in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA) sought to close a number of
financing loopholes along with adding new restrictions
on campaign donations.
Since the 1970s there have been a number of
unsuccessful attempts to extend public-finance laws to
races for Congress. For example, one such proposal was
unsuccessfully promoted by Senator George Mitchell
(D-Maine) during his tenure as Senate Majority Leader.
Although more than 20 states have enacted some
form of partial public financing of state elections, only
two states—Maine and Arizona—offered full public
financing of state legislative elections as of 2006, joined
by Connecticut in 2008. Following the lead of Justice
Louis Brandeis, political commentators have sometimes
referred to state governments as the “laboratories of
democracy” because lessons learned from state-level
reforms can be applied in other states or at the national
level. For that reason, Maine’s experience with full public
financing holds great significance for ongoing debates
about campaign-finance reform across the nation.
The general topic of campaign finance has been
the subject of a great deal of research in political
science. The existing research, almost exclusively
concerned with national politics, has tended toward a
few broad types—empirical studies aimed at assessing
why some candidates fare better than others in raising
money, the impact of campaign finance on election
outcomes, and normative arguments in support or
48 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Summer/Fall 2010

opposition to various regulations. Another strain of
research has sought to measure what donors receive
in return for their campaign donations.
Although there is a limited literature examining
the effects of partial public financing on state election
outcomes (see Jones 1981; Penning and Smidt 1983),
no study has yet provided a comprehensive examination of the effects of full public financing on state
politics. The work of Mayer and Wood (1995) is
typical of the limited research that exists on the topic.
In their analysis of partial public funding in Wisconsin,
they found that such laws reduced the funding
disparity between challengers and incumbents, but
failed to make state legislative elections more competitive overall. Contrary evidence was provided by Goidel
and Gross (1996) who ran a series of sophisticated
quantitative simulations that showed public financing
generally leads to more competitive elections. Their
findings were consistent with those of Donnay and
Ramsden (1995) and Malbin and Gais (1998) who
found that Minnesota’s partial public financing laws
led to more competitive elections in that state.
Unfortunately, studies of Minnesota and Wisconsin’s
campaign-finance systems are of limited use due to
low levels of funding and candidate participation. Yet,
these limited and inconclusive findings are about all we
have in understanding the impact of public financing
on state government. Due to the limited amount of
research conducted to date, our understanding of this
area of growing importance is grossly incomplete. In
particular, we do not have a full understanding of the
effects of public financing on electoral outcomes.
DATA AND ANALYSIS

T

o assess the impact of public financing on legislative elections in Maine, I compiled a dataset of
all candidates running in the general election for the
Maine House of Representatives and Senate from
1994 to 2008.1 Although MCEA did not take effect
until the 2000 election cycle, I extended the dataset
back to 1994 to adequately capture any trends that
were already ongoing in Maine when MCEA took
effect. Thus, this study spans the first five elections
with public financing along with the three prior elections. For each legislative candidate, I collected data
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on gender, party affiliation,
candidate status (incumbent,
challenger, or candidate in
an open-seat race), campaign
funding, and the percentage
of votes received. Voterregistration data were collected
for each district in each election
cycle also.

Public Funding and
Candidate Entry

TABLE 2:

Percentage of Candidates Accepting MCEA Funds
by Incumbency Status, 2000–2008
HOUSE
Incumbent
(%)

Challenger
(%)

2000

23.1

2002

44.2

2004

SENATE
Open
(%)

Incumbent
(%)

Challenger
(%)

Open
(%)

27.5

41.2

50.0

65.0

40.0

66.7

68.9

80.0

69.6

69.6

73.4

79.5

83.7

86.4

81.8

72.4

2006

82.1

80.2

76.0

81.5

87.9

92.9

2008

80.9

80.0

89.7

76.9

78.6

85.0

At first glance, the data
clearly attest to the success
TABLE 3: Mean Fundraising and Expenditures by Candidate, 1994–2008
of MCEA in enticing
candidates to accept public
HOUSE
SENATE
financing and the accompaTotal
Total
nying regulations. As shown
Private
MCEA
Private
MCEA
Expenditures
Expenditures
Funds ($)
Funds ($)
Funds ($)
Funds ($)
in Table 1, by 2002, the
($)
($)
second election under
1994
3,796
-4,000
20,479
-20,232
MCEA, more than 60
1996
5,234
-4,989
20,808
-19,299
percent of house candidates
and nearly three-quarters of
1998
6,482
-5,974
24,523
-22,012
senate candidates partici2000
3,699
++
4,519
10,881
++
22,581
pated in the new system.
2002
2,635
3,812
5,921
8,800
18,024
22,947
Moreover, participation
2004
1,574
5,737
6,529
7,447
25,077
32,614
rates rose steadily over the
next three election cycles.
2006
1,989
7,672
8,079
4,876
32,556
33,671
By 2008, 83 percent of
2008
1,459
6,695
7,137
3,942
34,103
31,890
house candidates and
1994–1998
4,899***
4,984***
20,911***
20,515***
almost 80 percent of senate
(mean)
candidates accepted public
2000–2008
financing. As shown in
1,828***
6,489***
5,732***
28,898***
(mean)
Table 2, MCEA has been
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
effective in getting the
++MCEA funds were disbursed to candidates, but the state’s online disclosure system was not yet fully functional.
participation of incumbents, challengers, and
candidates in open-seat
races, with all three types of candidates generally
of private contributions raised by legislative candidates
participating about 80 percent of the time.
has decreased significantly in both the house and
As discussed earlier, one of the chief aims of
senate. In the three elections prior to MCEA, house
MCEA’s proponents was to reduce the amount of
candidates raised an average of $4,899 from private
money being raised and spent in Maine’s legislative
contributors and their counterparts in senate races
elections, particularly private contributions. The data
raised $20,911. Under MCEA, there has been a
presented in Table 3 show that those goals have been
dramatic decrease in private contributions. From 2000
only partially met. Under MCEA, the average amount
to 2008, average fundraising from private sources
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TABLE 4:

Advantage in Total Expenditures by Winning
Candidates in Contested Races, Open-Seat and
Non-Open-Seat Races, 1994–2008
HOUSE
Incumbent
($)

SENATE

Open Race
($)

Incumbent
($)

Open Race
($)

1994

2,356

793

8,073

5,166

1996

1,733

1,690

10,244

7,622

1998

2,491

4,122

11,533

-8,534

2000

1,750

1,602

-1,220

9,426

2002

1,726

1,634

3,027

5,388

2004

482

160

-9,756

4,416

2006

571

1,530

2,263

6,224

2008

260

1,080

771

12,511

1994–1998
(mean)

2,189***

1,803

10,117***

4,680

2000–2008
(mean)

896***

1,188

-656***

7,462

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

decreased to $1,828 in the house and $5,732 in the
senate. Overall, the amount of direct private contributions to Maine’s legislative candidates has dropped by
more than 60 percent under MCEA.2
Of course, elections are still costly affairs, so candidates have relied on MCEA funds to fill the void. In
the 2008 election cycle, candidates accepted an average
of $6,695 in MCEA funds in house races and more
than $34,000 in senate races. In this regard, the performance of MCEA has been mixed. Although candidates’
reliance on private funding has decreased substantially,
total expenditures have increased significantly. From
1994 to 1998, the average candidate spent a total of
$4,984 in house races and $20,515 in senate races.
Under MCEA, from 2000 to 2008 the total per candidate expenditures rose to $6,489 and $28,898 in the
house and senate, respectively.

Bivariate Analysis:
An Initial Look at Competitiveness

As already discussed, one of the chief goals
of public financing’s proponents has been to make
50 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Summer/Fall 2010

elections more competitive. Numerous studies have
shown that U.S. elections, including those for state
legislatures, have become less competitive in recent
decades (see, for example, Jacobson 2001). One of the
chief reasons behind this noncompetitiveness has been
the enormous electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents. The advantages of incumbency are numerous
and have been studied exhaustively by political scientists. Undoubtedly, chief among them is the significant
advantage that incumbents enjoy over challengers in
raising campaign funds. Even in open-seat races, betterfunded candidates are typically in an advantageous
position relative to their opponents.
Political scientists have generally measured the
broad concept of “competitiveness” in at least three
specific ways. In its most basic form, a competitive
election is one that is contested. In a healthy democratic system, voters should have different candidates
from whom to choose. In situations where incumbents
are perceived to hold an insurmountable advantage,
however, potential challengers may not be willing to
undertake a campaign. Advocates of publicly funded
campaigns have argued that such reforms will increase
the number of candidates by removing one of the
largest barriers to candidate entry—relative disadvantages in fundraising capacity. The margin of victory of
winning candidates is another means of assessing the
competitiveness of elections. Numerous studies have
demonstrated the link between fundraising and votes
won. By equalizing the playing field in terms of
campaign funding, public financing should lead to
narrower margins of victory for winning candidates,
other things being equal. Ultimately, electoral competitiveness can be measured by the reelection rate of
incumbents. In other words, does public financing
actually reduce the advantages of incumbency to such
an extent that challengers are more likely to win?
Table 4, which shows the average advantage in total
expenditures of winning candidates over their opponents, provides evidence that MCEA has been successful
in narrowing the funding gap between candidates. In
house races with incumbents running for reelection,
winning candidates (almost always incumbents) spent
an average of $2,189 more than their opponents from
1994 to 1998. Under MCEA, this funding gap has
been cut by more than 60 percent to $896. The senate
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experienced an even more dramatic change. From 1994
to 1998, winning candidates outspent their opponents
by more than $10,117. However, from 2000 to 2008,
losing candidates actually outspent winners by an
average of $656. The changes for both the house and
senate were statistically significant. On the other hand,
the funding differences between winning and losing
candidates in open-seat races, much smaller to begin
with, have not changed in a statistically significant way
under MCEA in either the house or senate.
As a first test, I examined the three measures of
competitiveness by comparing the time periods of
1994–1998 with 2000–2008 for each one. The first
question we need to address is: Has the number of
contested seats risen under MCEA? The average
number of contested house races has increased under
MCEA from 125 during the 1994–1998 period to
134.6 in the 2000–2008 period and from 32.3 to 33.2
in the senate over the same period. Neither change,
however, is statistically significant. The senate results,
in particular, are not surprising given the rate at which
senate races have been contested by Republicans and
Democrats. Typically, the major parties have made
extensive efforts to recruit a candidate for every senate
seat. This has been particularly true over the time
period examined in this study because of the pivotal
nature the senate has played in key state issues and
because the parties have been closely divided.
Legislative term limits, in effect in Maine since 1996,
have also likely contributed to the large number of
contested senate seats. As members of the house have
been term limited, many of them have chosen to run
immediately for the senate. Further, Moen, Palmer
and Powell (2005) found that the power of the Maine
senate has increased at the expense of the house under
term limits, as more experienced members have
migrated to the senate.
The second measure of competitiveness is the
margin of victory of winning candidates. I analyzed the
average margin of victory in house and senate races by
year, broken down by races in which incumbents were
running for election and open-seat races in which they
were not. Under MCEA, the average margin of victory
has decreased slightly in non-open-seat races in both
the house and the senate. From 1994 to 1998, races
with incumbents running for reelection were decided

by a margin of 22 percent in the house and 23.7
percent in the senate. From 2000 to 2008, this
dropped to 21.8 percent in the house and 20.1 percent
in the senate. Nevertheless, both decreases were slight
and not statistically significant. Similarly, the average
margin of victory in both houses in open-seat races did
not change in a statistically significant way.
Finally, we need to ask whether these small, statistically insignificant changes in contestedness and
margin of victory have resulted in a decrease in the
incumbency reelection rate. After all, in races with
incumbents, the average margin of victory, although
slightly smaller, has remained greater than 20 percent.
My analysis found that incumbent reelection rates have
not changed in a statistically significant way under
MCEA. In the house, incumbents have actually been
reelected at a slightly higher rate under MCEA (88.0
percent compared with 85.6 percent previously), with
a modest decrease in the senate (90.0 percent under
MCEA compared with 95.4 percent previously).
In sum, a first glance at the data suggests that the
goal of MCEA in creating greater electoral competitiveness has not been met. Neither house nor senate races
have been contested at a statistically significant higher
rate. Further, neither incumbents’ average margin of
victory nor their overall reelection rate has changed in
a statistically significant way.

By equalizing the playing field in
terms of campaign funding, public
financing should lead to narrower
margins of victory for winning
candidates, other things being equal.
These trends provide us with an interesting starting
point in assessing the impact of MCEA on electoral
competition in Maine. Yet, during this same time
period there have been a number of other potentially
relevant factors that may have influenced competitiveness. For example, as mentioned earlier, Maine began
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imposing legislative term limits in 1996. Increased electoral competitiveness was also one of the primary goals
of that reform. Another potentially complicating factor
is that Maine’s legislative districts were redrawn
following the 2000 census, some of them very significantly due to the large-scale population shifts in some
areas of the state since the 1990 census. The new
districts took effect with the 2004 election. Obviously,
any impact of MCEA in terms of competitiveness may
be clouded by changes in voter partisanship in the
various districts. For these reasons, it is necessary to
subject these initial findings to more rigorous examination using multivariate analysis.

…public funding may not be the panacea
that its supporters wished it would be, nor
does it substantially reduce the electoral
advantage enjoyed by incumbents.
Multivariate Analysis:
Assessing Electoral Competitiveness

To isolate the effects of MCEA on whether elections were contested, I analyzed the data using more
advanced multivariate statistical modeling, designed
to control for the effects of a wide range of variables
on one another. For example, my analysis took into
account the partisan mix of voters and past voting
patterns in each legislative district. In doing so, I
expected that the larger the size of the majority party’s
advantage in a district, the less likely a race would be
contested. In making the choice of whether or not to
run, potential candidates certainly weigh the costs of
running against their perceived chance of winning.
As the percentage of voters from the opposite party
increases, the chances of winning decrease. Similarly,
I expected that a challenger will be less likely to run as
the incumbent’s past percentage of the vote increases.3
The results from these analyses show a number
of interesting things. For example, in districts with
incumbents running for reelection, MCEA has
increased the probability of an incumbent facing a
52 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · Summer/Fall 2010

challenger by six percent in the house, a statistically
significant change. MCEA has not been associated with
a statistically significant increase in contested senate
seats, however, probably due to the high rate of
contestedness these races experienced even before
public financing.
In open-seat races, public financing does not
increase the likelihood of contested seats in either the
house or senate. Similar to the senate results, this may
be because open seats were already more likely to be
contested; there just is not much room for a statistically
significant increase to occur in open-seat races. Prior
research suggests this may be even truer since the
advent of term limits in 1996, as potential challengers
wait for open seats, knowing that any incumbent has
at most eight years in office.
In relation to the second measure of competitiveness, margin of victory, MCEA has resulted in closer
vote margins by just more than three percent in house
races when challengers accept public financing, a statistically significant change. The results suggest, however,
that incumbents may be able to partially offset that gain
by accepting public financing themselves. In the senate,
public financing for either candidate did not have a
statistically significant impact on margin of victory.
In open-seat races, the acceptance of public
financing by the losing candidate narrowed the winner’s
margin of victory in both the house and senate. In
house races, this resulted in a narrowing of the margin
of victory by 3.3 percent; the impact was even greater
in the senate with a change of nearly six percent.
Turning to our final measure of competitiveness,
I sought to determine the impact of MCEA on the
likelihood of an incumbent victory in non-open-seat
races. The results show that MCEA funding can have
an impact on the likelihood of an incumbent victory,
depending upon which candidates participate. The
probability of a challenger defeating an incumbent
increases by five and ten percent in the house and
senate, respectively, when the challenger accepts public
funding. Incumbents can more than negate those gains,
however, by accepting public funds for their own
campaigns. Taken as a whole, the results indicate that
incumbents benefit disproportionately from MCEA
once they make the decision to accept public funds,
regardless of whether the challenger participates.
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Although the advantage for incumbents is diminished
when facing an MCEA challenger, the key factor is
whether or not the incumbent—not the challenger—
participates in MCEA.
DISCUSSION

P

ublic financing of legislative campaigns has been
touted by supporters as a means of enhancing electoral competition and reducing the influence of donors
on the legislative process. My focus here has been the
first issue: Does public financing increase competitiveness? In answering this question, I examined the impact
of the Maine Clean Elections Act on three measures
of electoral competitiveness: contestedness, margin
of victory, and incumbent reelection rate. Taken as a
whole, the results of my analyses indicate that public
financing has had only the slightest effects on electoral
competition for the Maine Legislature. Under MCEA,
house incumbents are about six percent more likely to
face a challenger when running for reelection, but this
has not been the case in the senate. Contested elections
are no more likely in open-seat races under MCEA
than before in either the house or senate. Margins of
victory are slightly smaller in races with MCEA candidates, but the average incumbent still wins by a margin
of more than 20 percent in the house and senate, and
winners of open-seat races still win by about 15 percent
in both houses. In terms of actual wins and losses, challengers are only more likely to win if they participate
in MCEA and the incumbent does not. When incumbents accept public funding, they are actually more
likely to win reelection.
In sum, my study found that MCEA has not had
a significant impact on increasing electoral competition
for the Maine Legislature even though candidates have
relied on substantially less in private contributions and
the financial disparity between candidates has diminished significantly. It has not benefited challengers, nor
does it appear to be serving as an “incumbency protection act” as some observers predicted (see Goidel and
Gross 1996: 130). So why hasn’t MCEA translated into
greater competitiveness? The explanation may rest with
the old adage that money, like water running downhill,
will always find a way around new campaign finance
regulations. Like many other efforts to regulate

campaign finance, MCEA has been compromised by
some significant loopholes. Despite widespread participation in a system in which candidates are forbidden
from accepting private contributions, outside money
continues to pour into the system. For example, under
MCEA individual legislators are permitted to create
leadership political action committees (PACs) that are
substantially unregulated. Further, MCEA candidates
can raise money for these PACs. Like the soft-money
loophole in pre-BCRA U.S. national elections, these
PACs have been able to raise large sums of money that
can be used to influence particular races. The major
restriction is that leadership PACs are not permitted to
serve as conduits between specific donors and candidates. In other words, donors are not permitted to have
any involvement in how their donations are spent by
leadership PACs. In short, private campaign contributions are no longer permitted to candidates accepting
public financing, but those funds are still being used to
benefit those candidates in an indirect manner. Since
leadership PACs are typically used by leaders to further
their own political interests, they are most likely to
donate to candidates likely to win—usually incumbents
and co-partisans in competitive open-seat races.
For the purposes of the present discussion, this
loophole seems to be severely hampering the effectiveness of MCEA in reducing the amount of money in
campaigns and in increasing electoral competitiveness.
Outside money is still finding its way into legislative
elections. It is certainly possible that the other goal of
MCEA—limiting the legislative influence presumed to
come with contributions—is being furthered since
candidates do not have direct links with donors. That
particular topic is beyond the scope of the present
study, but it is an important avenue for further research.
My findings suggest that public funding may not
be the panacea that its supporters wished it would be,
nor does it substantially reduce the electoral advantage
enjoyed by incumbents. Electoral competitiveness in
Maine has not been appreciably affected by MCEA.
Over time, it will be interesting to see if the experience
of Connecticut—and, perhaps other states considering
public-financing laws geared toward high participation
rates—will be similar to Maine’s in its first five election
cycles with this reform. -

View current & previous issues of MPR at: mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/?q=MPR

Please turn the page for notes, references, and author information.

Volume 19, Number 2 · MAINE POLICY REVIEW · 53

IMPACT OF MAINE’S CLEAN ELECTIONS ACT

ENDNOTES
1. Candidate data and election returns were obtained
from the Maine Secretary of State’s office. Data on
campaign funding were obtained from the Maine
Ethics Commission, which oversees and enforces
Maine’s campaign finance laws.
2. All data on campaign funding and expenditures
used in this study have been adjusted for inflation
and are presented in constant dollars using 1994 as
a base.
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3. The results of the multivariate models are summarized here. More detailed information about the
statistical models employed can be obtained from
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